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Kaufmann and Wang find that a country's  insulated from the effects of general economic
economic policies significantly affect the perfor-  policy.
mance of investment projects in the social
sectors, especially education. Their findings  Kaufmann and Wang present an analytical
underscore the need to link strategy in the social  framework to suggest the mechanisms through
sectors - even at the project level - to a  which such policies affect each stage of a project
country's  structural adjustment and broad  cycle. They use statistical analysis and case
economic policies.  studies from a broad range of sector reports and
project documents.
It is important, they say, to fully integrate
existing and expected economic policy into  Bivariate statistical analysis of the incidence
project preparation and project appraisal docu-  of unsatisfactory projects shows that social
ments in the social sector.  projects are two to three times as likely to be
rated unsatisfactory where there is restrictive
The paucity of robust quantitative informa-  trade, overvalued currency, a fiscal deficit, and
tion on the costs and benefits of social projects  relative price distortions. The evidence is even
may have perpetuated the false notion that social  stronger when data only for education projects
projects, unlike other types of projects, may be  are examined.
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This work was initiated during
preparations of the World Development  Report 1991, and has benefitted from discussions  and inputs
from other members of the WDR team and from OED and operational  Bank staff involved  in the
social sectors.I.  Introduction
The importance  of project-  and  sector-level  determinants  of project  performance  in the social
sectors  has been  widely  recognized  and studied. By contrast,  the linkages  between  economy-wide  policies,
on the one hand,  and project-level  success  in social  investments,  on the other,  has been  neither  universally
accepted  nor studied  in depth. Partly, this is due to the lack  of robust  empirical  measures  of project
performance  in the social  sectors  (such  as Economic  Rates  of Return  (ERR))  and  partly  due to insufficient
data  on economy-wide  policy  variables. In addition,  the conventional  wisdom  has been  that, in contrast  to
the impact  of macroeconomic  policies  on the tradeable  sectors  (agriculture  and industry),  in the social
sectors  (as well  as in infrastructure),  the effects  ot a distorted  or unstable  macro-policy  environment  are
weaker. For infrastructure,  this view  has been  challenged  through  the analysis  of projects'  ERR's which
indicated  that  economy-wide  policies  do matter  significantly,  as they  do in the tradeable  sectors  (Kaufmnann
1991). Although  the Bank's  social  sector  lending  experience  in many  developing  countries  does  suggest
that  economy-wide  policies  do matter,  the issue  of macro-micro  linkages  in these  sectors  has not been  fully
addressed  in the literature  in general,  or within  the Bank  in particular. More  specifically,  the mechanisms
through  which  macroeconomic  policies  affect  project  performance  at the various  stages  of the project  cycle
have  not been  rigorously  explored  either.
The main  objective  of this study  is to explore  the relationship  between  a country's  overall
economic  policy  environment  and  the performance  of investment  projects  in the social  sectors. We focus
on the impact  of economy-wide  policies  including  a range  of fiscal,  monetary,  exchange  rate, trade, and
pricing  indicators.  Particular  emphasis  is put on the analysis  of projects  in education,  which  comprise  the-2  -
large majority  of the Bank's social projects.
The methodology  combines  statistical  analysis and case studies, with the latter based on a broad
range of sectoral reports, Project Completion  Reports (PCRs), Project Performance  Audit Reports
(PPARs), and sustainability  analysis  conducted  by the Operation  Evaluation  Department  (OED) of the
World Bank.  The statistical  analysis  draws on the OED project data as well as the country-level  policy
performance  variables of the WDR'91 data set.  Since the attempt at rigorously linking macro-determinants
with project outcomes  in the social sectors is a new area of research, our paper should be seen as an initial
effort in this area.  We expect to elicit comments  and reactions  leading to further research.
The next section  briefly reviews the literature. To supplement  the limited literature, Section Im
examines  some country- and project case studies which begin to suggest the relationship  between economy-
wide policies and project performance. Section  IV presents a simple analytical  framework  of the possible
linkages  between the economic  policy environment  and project performance. Section V discusses  the data
and empirical  method.  Section  VI presents the results from statistical  analysis. Concluding  remarks and
implications  are provided in the final section.
II.  Brief Review  of the Literature
Literature on the impact of economy-wide  policies on project performance  in the social sectors is
quite limited. Very few cross country studies exist, although  some sectoral reports and PCRs and PPARs
have touched  upon this issue.'  The relevant studies we found include one sustainability  study conducted
by OED, a series papers on the implementation  of educational  policies, and a few World Bank Policy
Studies.  We will review this literature briefly in this section.
I This part is based on a survey of literature covering  the summaries  of 158 PPARs  and/or PCRs, about
20 sectoral reports and about 20 Working papers, discussion  papers, and policy  studies.-3  -
The OED report (World Bank, 1990)  is a sustainability  analysis  of investment  projects in
Education. It examined  a number of education  projects to see whether the initial investment  has cortinued
to produce benefits well beyond project completion  (about 10 years after completion),  and investigated  the
factors affecting  sustainability. Sustainability  was defined as the continuation  of desired benefits from a
given investment,  and was measured  by several sustainability  indicators. The Report argues that the
following  principal factors constituted  the necessary  conditions  for sustainability: sound project design and
relatively  problem-free  implementation;  adequate  funding for recurrent costs, and institutional  support in
the post-completion  period; and clear policy support for the project from the borrower.  However, it is
stated that none of the above factors alone is sufficient  for sustainability. Further, the report found:
"the external economic  and policy environment  affects sustainability
through the fiscal resources the borrower ma'.es (or does not make)
available  to support educational  development,  or through policy measures
to back up specific sub-sectors. External  factors also affect sustainability
indirectly  through macroeconomic  effects on labor markets, which
determine  the capacity of the economy  to absorb graduates." (p.viii)
However, due to an insufficient  number of observations  (twelve  observations), 2 the conclusions
from the statistical analysis  carried out are not quite robust (p.36).  Moreover, there are measurement
problems with the variables. The study evaluated each variable (both dependent  and independent)  for a
given project in terms of a four-point scoring system.  Each  aspect of performance  or policy
3 was judged
to be good, fair, poor, or zero, with corresponding  numerical  values of 3, 2, 1, or 0.  These scores are a
mixture of quantitative  and qualitative  variable, and it is difficult  to maintain consistency  across projects
such that a given score for a variable in one project represents  the same thing in another. Furthermore, the
2 These include five case studies in Indonesia,  Malawi  and Columbia  (3 projects), and eight projects from
Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, the Philippines,  Sierra Leone  and Thailand. Columbia I and II are considered
one observation. All of them were completed  during 1969-79,  and were re-evaluated  during 1988-89.
3 The policy variables include, overall level of government  support, macroeconomic  conditions,  education
sector conditions,  and level of policy  commitment,  all measured  by the four-point  score system.-4  -
project benefits in terms of productivity-wage  enhancement  due to human capital investment  is not captured
by anv of these measures.
A series of papers were published  recently on the implementations  of educational  policies in
Africa. 4 These papers generally  focus only on sectoral policies.  Only a few touched upon the relationship
between macro- policies and the implementation  of educational  policies. For example, Achola (1990)
found that in Zambia the problems with implementation  of educational  policies were associated  with a
declining  economy  since the mid-1970s, resulting  from falling copper prices, high oil bill and a drain on
foreign exchange, poor pricing policy in agriculture, and poor harvests.  A rapidly growing population  (3.7
percent annually in 1980-89)  resulted in greater demand for more new primary schools and/or school
places, difficulties  in educational  financing and low quality  of education. Economic  decline caused
unemployment  among school-leavers  and high dropout rates at the end of primary education. The
estimates  ranged from 1 to 1.5 million unemployed  youth, most of them young school leavers. Kelly
(1991) also examined  the impact  of Zambia's declining  economy  on the provision of formal education  from
1975 to 1985. The paper showed  that the consequences  included a substantial  reduction in expenditure  pai
student, a depreciation  of the real income of teachers to about 40 percent of their 1975  value, and a greater
reliance on the community,  the private sector, and foreign aid for support to the education  sector.
Bank policy studies have examined  the relationship  of education  and the overall economic
environment. The adverse effects on education  of a rapidly growing population, a stagnant  economy,
I These studies evaluate  the comprehensive  experience  of eight Anglophone  Eastern and Southem  African
countries, each of which had developed  and issued  major education  policy reforms or pronouncements. After
reviewing 153 cases of educational  policies, Craig found that only a handful  (12 cases, 8 percent of total) were
mostly or fully implemented". Why educational  policies can fail? Psacharopoulos  concludes  that it is mainly
because  of insufficient,  or the absence  of implementation,  which can be attributed to vaguely  stated policies,
unspecified  financing  scheme, and unclear theoretical  relationship  between instruments  and outcomes.  The
results indicate  an urgent need for the formulation  of more concrete, feasible  and implementable  policies based
on documented  cause-effect  relationships. See Psacharopoulos  (1990), Craig (1990), Kiros (1990), Eshiwani
(1990), Galabawa  (1990), Thelejani (1990), Magalula  (1990), Odaet (1990), Achola (1990) and Maravanyika
(1990).-5-
massiv- fiscal deficit and the reduction of public spending, were fully recognized,  and the need for
adjustment  and structural :eform was called for (e.g. Tan and Mingat 1989, World Bank 1988). However,
these studies did not address the problamsi  in project performance. Numerous  other studies investigate  the
contribution  of better education  and health to economic  growth (e.g. Haddad, Carnoy, Rinaldi and Regel
1990) or policies to reform the education  sector and improve the quality of education  (health) services (e.g.
Rondinelli, Middleton  and Verspoor 1988, Verspoor 1989). These studies examine  the micro to macro
relationship,  whereas the macro to micro linkage is beyond the scope of these studies.
A large literature can be found on the allocative  efficiency  within social sectors, the problems  of
mistarge.ting,  and the equity and efficiency  issues in  deI  I.ig  social services (e.g. James 1989, World
Bank 1988a, Psacharopoulos,  Tan and Jimenez 1986, Tan and Mingat 1989, and Winkler 1988). While
these papers do not address the issue of economy-wide  policies directly, they suggest  that the allocation  of
social spending do have important  effects on the performance  of investment  projects.  For example,
Birdsall and James (1990) indicate  that,
'the average rate of return [to education  projects] in developing  countries
has been estimated  24% at the primary level, 15% at the secondary  and
13% at the higher education  level.  Even if these rates of return are
upwardly biased, the ranking  of actual returns across levels of education
is probably correctly captured. Yet, many countries spend a
disproportionate  share of their total educational  budgets at the tertiary
level. (p.10)"
Similar mistargeting  problems are found in the health sector. The study calls for a reallocation  of public
spending for programs that would improve  efficiency  and equity, such as immunization  programs, rural
health clinics, and primary schools. Their study suggests  that the allocation  of social spending within
education  and other social sectors affects the rates of returns of investment  and also the performance  of
projects.6-
III.  Case Studies
III.A  Country case-studies
In this sub-section,  we briefly review some country  cases, both successes and failures, based on
the Bank's country studies or sector reports.
A.  Thailand's education  segtor: a successful  story
The implementation  of education  policy in Thailand has been quite successful. Public
expenditure  on education  in Thailand  rose to about 20 percent of the national  budget during 1976-1984.
Thailand  has now achieved  universal  primary education, and the adult literacy rate rose from 68 percent in
1961 to 91 percent in 1985 with an average enrollment  ratio of about 20 percent at the tertiary level.
One of the central reasons attributed to the success in education  development  is Thailand's
overall macroeconomic  environment  during the past few decades. The Thai economy  has been growing
steadily at an annual rate of 7.3 in 1965-80  and 7.0 in 1980-89. Along with the industrialization  and
employment  shifting away from agriculture,  there is a surge in demand.  for better educated  labor, which is
reflected by job vacancy trends and employers' report of difficulty  in recruiting and keeping  such workers.
The unemployment  rates have been very low (1.3 percent in 1987  and 0.8 percent for 1988). This surge
in demand for educated  labor has created  great private and public incentives  to invest in education  and
better utilization  of existing  facilities.
The second reason is the lower rate of population  growth in the last 20 years, resulting from a
general income growth and a highly successful  family planning  program.  The total fertility rate 5 declined
dramatically  from 6.31 in 1960s  to 2.48 in 1989. The dependency  ratio has been declining  steadily since
1970. This reduced the relative size of the school-age  population, and correspondingly  lightened  the
5  Total fertility rate is the average number of children  that would  be born alive to a woman during her
lifetime, if she were to bear children at each age in accordance  with the prevailing  age-specific  fertility rates.-7-
working adults' fiscal burden for public spending on education. (Sources: Sussangkarn  1990, World Bank
1991, 1989)
Although problems still exist, such as a low secondary  enrollment  ratio, large regional
disparities, and high unit costs in primary education,  etc., Thailand's educational  reforms have been
designed  to tackle the problems. And the policies have remained  flexible  and responsive, with a
willingness  to adopt new approaches  if the old ones fail to meet objectives. In sum, a steady economic
growth and subsequent  demand  for educated  labor, lower population  growth, and flexible  and responsive
sectoral policies provided a favorable environment  for Thailand's success in educational  development.
B.  Brazil: Mis-targeting  and inefficiency
Brazil spends a significant  share of its GDP on social services, a total of 18 percent of GDP in
1986 (federal 9 percent; state 9 percent).  In 1985, about 1.4 percent of GDP was spent (by central
government alone) on education  and 1.8 percent on health.  However, social welfare indicators are
strikingly low:  infant mortality in Brazil (59 per thousand in 1989) is well above the average for countries
in its income group (45.2), and in the Northeast of Brazil (116 per thousand in 1985), it is higher than in
much of Sub-3aharan  Africa.  Secondary  enrollment  was only 21 percent in 1984, compared with
90 percent in Korea.  Large regional disparities  exist in literacy rates, school enrollment, other social
indicators, and in per capita income.
Why Brazilian  federal expenditure  has not achieved  more? First, inflation  and poor expenditure
policies have resulted in stop-and-go  financing and inefficient  inter-governmental  transfers.  Transfers are
often made with an uncertain  time and in an inflationary  economy,  the real value of the resource can be
quickly eroded, forcing agencies into inefficient  budget adjustment, "start and stop" construction  programs,
disrupted procurement  and delayed maintenance. Second, excessive  transaction  costs and wastes were
caused by institutional  arrangement  that led to overly centralized  federal programs,  and lack of incentives
for cost-effectiveness  due to the lack of transparency  and accountability  in the financing  of social programs.-8  -
Third, price distortions  caused  by government  control of private school tuition, have limited the expansion
of private education,  prevented  the appropriate  use of the private sector and reduced competition  and
overall efficiency. Fourth, poor expenditure  policy Ud to mistargeting  within and across sectors.
Relatively  high public subsidies  are provided for the types of programs that are not likely to reach the poor
and the vulnerable. For example, 78 percent of the health spending is spent on curative  hospital care in
1986, only 22 percent for primary care.  In education,  an estimated  23 percent of total government
education  spending  (federal, state, and minicipio)  goes to universities, and only 9 percent to secondary
education,  compared with 11 percent and 37 percent respectively, in Korea.
ILI.B Project case-studies
This sub-section  reviews several project cases based on the Bank's Project Performance  Audit
Reports (PPARs) and Project Completion  Reports (PCRs). These reports do not systematically  address
overall econemy-wide  policies or pricing policies for the sector.  Often the macro and sectoral policy
information  is not included. Therefore, the linkage between  policies and performance  is not always clear
from this documentation.
A.  Zaire:  Education  I.  1971-81
The project was designed  to help finance construction,  equipment  and rehabilitation  of
existing/new  facilities for the training of secondary  teachers and teacher trainers.  The IDA loan of US$6.5
million was to cover about 55 percent of the cost.  However, the project did not receive local currency
funds on a regular basis which caused  delays.  Serious inflation,  and a rapid devaluation  of the Zaire
resulted in high cost overruns and slowed down ir. v, ,mentation. By 1982, only a fraction of the physical
components  were completed  and the rest of the loan was canceled. Civil wars also adversely affected  the
implementation,  especially  in the Shaba region. Other factors include, lack of support from Department  of
National Education, incomplete  architectural  plans aggregated  by poor management  and supervision. In-9-
sum, although  the services of the project were very much demanded  and the enrollment  objectives  have
been exceeded  at three institutions, fiscal problems  led to lack of counter-part  funding, serious inflation  and
wars prevented the project to attain full completion.
B.  Bangladesh/Pakistan: Education  project 1964-76
Tnis project was to increase the national  capacity  for the education  and training of professional
agriculturalists,  industrial technicians  and technical  teachers.  Total project costs were estimated  at US$9
million and the US$4.5 million  IDA credit was to be applied to the equipment  and personnel costs.  Due to
politica and macroeconomic  instability,  the completion  of building  construction  and equipment
procurement  took twice the time originally  anticipated. The construction  and equipment  costs increased
20-50 percent, however, the extent of cost overrun was not ascertainable.
The project facility was seriously under-utilized. Due to the slow development  of teaching,
research and extension  programs, student  enrollment  at the agricultural  university  did not expand. The
number of graduates in technical institutes  was only half that projected, and demand  for them was lower
than supply. The equipment  financed was to some large extent idle and poorly maintained. Overall, the
general unusual financial, political, and institutional  difficulties  prevailed  in this period, and the slow
economic  and agricultural  growth have been the main reasous for the project's failure.
C.  Tanzania:  Fifth education  project, 1975-1982
The US$11.0 million  IDA credit was to expedite  rural development  by training and housing to
Village Management  Technicians  (VMTs);  assist in diversification  of the secondary  school curricula;
upgrading  the training of accounting  and auditing personnel,  etc.  The project was completed  on time but
its objectives  were only partially met.  Only thirteen out of fifteen schools were completed,  and 420 houses
for the VMTs were built compared to 1,500 projected at appraisal.  The major factors include a) lack of
counterpart  funds due to fiscal problems; b) nonavailability  of building materials, construction  equipment,
and transportation  facilities which related to national  physical infrastructure;  c) low motivations  towards- 10-
self-help  approach (e.g. only 900 bicycles out of 2000 estimated  were purchased  and used); and d)
inadequate  supervision  by regional and district authorities.
D.  Philippines: Fishery training project
The Fishery Training Project in the Philippines  is to establish  a national  fishery training system
to meet the needs for research and technical manpower  in fishing industry. The project consists of one
university and seven Regional  Institutes of Fisheries Technology  and regional fishermen  training centers.
The loan of US$38.00 million was approved  in December, 1979  and the project was closed in December
1987, two and half years later than expected, with 83 percent cost overrun in Pesos and a 23 percent
underrun in US currency equivalent.
Until 1989, the project institutions  remained  seriously under-utilized. Undergraduate  enrollment
at the College of Fisheries was less than one-fifth of appraisal estimates  and was declining  since the mid-
1980s. This is due to the sluggish growth in the fisheries  sector and lack of employment  opportunities.
Subsequent  studies determined  the resource base to be smaller than expected,  total production was
significantly  less than planned in 1987 and there was no shift toward large commercial  operations. The
demand  for skilled commercial  fishing operators did not materialize.
This can be considered  a case of 'cart leading the horse."  Project expectations  for sectoral
performance  were over-optimistic,  especially  in light of the lack of a comprehensive  long-term
development  plan, which led to the choice of an inappropriate  project.  Agricultural  higher education,
alone, is insufficient  to promote productivity  growth (the growth rate of agriculture  sector was 1.8 percent
in 1980-88),  in the absence  of a strongly supportive  economic  and sectoral policy framework and the
appropriate  resource base.- 11 -
IV.  Towards a Framework of Analysis
The net benefits of a project can be encapsulated  in the discounted  stream of benefits and costs,
as reflected in equation (1):
t n PAQ-C  (1 NPV=E  - 1
=o  (I +r)
where:  NPV = Net Present Value
P. = Productivity (or Wage) gain per project 'graduate' in period i ;  =  Number of project graduates  in period i
C  =  Overall  project costs (capital investment  as well as recurrent) in period i
r  = opportunity  cost of capital or discount  rate
Appropriate corrections  for shadow  pricing and externality estimates  can, at least in theory, be
performed in order to arrive at an estimate  of the economic  benefits of the project.  While we know that a
full estimation  of benefits and costs in social projects is extremely  difficult and is very rarely done, the
simple decomposition  in equation (1) will nonetheless  be useful for presenting  the main elements  of a
framework  of analysis.
Economy-wide  policies can be classified into four categories: i) fiscal and monetary policies, ii)
exchange rate policies, iii) external trade policies, and iv) internal  trade and regulatory policies (including
labor regulations). These, in turn, can be hypothesized  to affect the stream of project costs and benefits in
a variety of ways, some very directly, some through more indirect mechanisms.
Overly expansionary  fiscal and monetary policies result in high and variable rates of inflation,
leading, in turn, to cost overruns, and to difficulties  in project planning and budgeting. The term Cq  in
equation  (1) is thus particu.larly  affected. More narrowly, but possibly more important, is the fact that
poor fiscal policy is also often associated  with poor expenditure  policy for the social sectors: fiscal
instability  results in stop-and-go  social expenditure  financing. This, in turn, increases  the overall project- 12  -
costs (C;), and reduces the quality and quantity  of project graduates  (PiQi)-since  poorly (or belatedly)  paid
teachers and lack of teaching  materials affect both the quality of the human capital acquired, as well as the
overall supply and demand for educational  training (and thus the "project's" capacity  utilization). 6 Poor
fiscal policy is also associated  with poor expenditure  policy in a noncausal  way:  often governments  which
have poor overall fiscal policies are not apt at appropriating  social expenditures  either, and are not adept at
inter- and intra-sectoral  prioritization.
An overvalued  and/or volatile exchange  rate can have a number  of deleterious  effects on social
project performance.' First, it may lead to inadequate  budgeting for the project, as the overvaluation  may
become unsustainable  during project implementation,  and the resulting  devaluation  results in large and
unexpected  cost overruns. Even if an overvalued  exchange  rate is maintained,  the import trade restrictions
that will follow may result in the inability  (or very high cost) of procuring critical inputs for the project.
Further, an overvalued exchange  rate distorts relative prices in the economy, inefficiently  reducing  demand
for tradeable  goods. This, in turn, reduces the demand for training in critical sectors, such as agriculture,
and other export-oriented  activities in general, lowering capacity  utilization  for these types of projects.
External trade restrictions can lead to spotty and more costly supply of project inputs, both
during and after implementation,  impairing  both the benefit as well as the cost stream of the project.
While some of these trade restrictions  may be ameliorated  by the external implementing  agency, in practice
it is impossible  to completely  insulate a project from the overall trade restrictions-particularly  once the
project is already operating. Furthermore, external  trade restrictions lower the productivity  and derived
demand  for training for the tradeable sectors (see above).
Domestic regulatory and trade restrictions  can be at least as damaging  to project performance  as
6  The same  argument  applies  for the quality  of nurses  and  availability  of medicines  in health  projects.
I  Exchange  rate  policies  are closely  linked  to fiscal,  monetary,  and trade  policies,  and thus  should  not be
regarded  as leaving  a fully  independent  impact  on project  performance.- 13 -
external  trade or exchange rate restrictions. In particular, restrictions on domestic  distribution of goods,
on domestic competition,  and on the operation of labor markets can affect the stream of benefits and costs
of the project.  Regulated  distribution  channels results in inadequate  supply of construction  materials and of
inputs critical for the project's operation, such as textbooks and medical supplies. Lack of domestic
competition, in general, reduces demand  for highly productive and skilled labor, while absence of private
sector competition  in the provision of education  and health services in particular can impair the quality and
quantity of the project's output.  Finally, labor market policy, such as mandated  wages and restriction  on
hiring and firing can have large effects on the demand for the project services, the motivations  of teachers
as well as, on the productivity  of graduates. More directly, inadequate  civil service wages (which is not
just the outcome of narrowly understood  labor policies, but the result of inappropriate  fiscal expenditure
policies) often undermine the implementation  of social projects due to the low productivity  of implementing
ministries and agencies, and of the quality of graduates  due to the lack of preparation  and motivation  of
teachers.  All economy-wide  policies (macro, trade, labor, and regulatcry)  have a joint and significant
impact on the overall rate of the GDP and productivity  growth of the economy. In turn, the overall
dynamism  of the economy  can affect the performance  of social projects. The benefits would be lower
where the economy is stagnant (affecting  Pi as well as Q.), while implementation  difficulties  through
insufficient  resources or scarcity of inputs will result in higher costs (C.).
The above discussion  sketched  various ways in which economy-wide  policies can affect the
stream of project benefits and costs.  These policies may have a different impact  on project performance
depending  on the stage of the project cycle.  Thus, the project cycle is divided into three stages, namely,
project identification  and preparation, project implementation,  and the operation  of the project after
completion. We hypothesize  on the that economic  policy distortions  affect projects at each stage of the
project implementation. Table 1 synthesizes  the framework  of analysis  being presented. The discussion
here focuses on the linkages between  economy-wide  policies and project performance. The importance  of- 14  -
institutional  project-and  sectoral specific factors has been studied in more detail and is widely
acknowledged. Consequently,  it is not treated in detail here.
Stage 1.  Project identification  and preparation. In this stage, typical problems could be that a
"wrong"  type of project/program or a "wrong" type of technology is chosen for the investment,  that is, the
kind of project chosen is not consistent  with the country's and/or the sector's priorities. For instance,
whether one should build an expensive  hospital  versus rural clinics which conduct primary and preventive
care, universities versus primary and secondary  schools; whether investment  should be made in physical
capital versus in recurrent expenditures  (teaching  materials, teachers' training and salaries) new investment
versus rehabilitation/maintenance,  etc.  Examples can be found in Brazil, Bangladesh,  and the Philippines,
as illustrated in Section III.
Economy-wide  policies are crucial at this stage of implementation  and can affect the project
choices  and design in various ways.  Overall economic  growth and demand  for high quality labor affect the
public initiatives  of investment  in social sectors.  A distorted  pricing structure may affect project and
technology  choice.  For example, free tuition for university education  can create excess demand for tertiary
education, and hence distort the project appraisal and choice.  An overvalued  exchange rate can result in an
overly capital and import-intensive  project.
Stage II.  Project implementation. At this critical stage of the project cycle, performance  can be
affected  dramatically  by economy-,  sector-, and project-level  factors.  Implementation  problems  include
cost overrun, delay of completion  or noncompletion,  poor quality and technical standards. Macro-
economic  imbalances  characterized  by large fiscal deficits, high and variable inflation  rates, stop-and-go
expenditure  policy and financing, and high interest rates can result in inadequate  counterpart  (domestic)- 15  -
funding  to the project, leading to serious delays and sometimes  noncompletion.' Unexpected  and/or
variable inflation results in demands  for unplanned  for expenditures--often  not met in a timely fashion or at
all, leading to cost and time overruns. Exchange rate and trade restrictions  prevent the flow of inputs or
raise their costs.  In addition, trade restriction, currency over-valuation,  and lack of competition  of the
domestic market affect the efficiency  of local construction  industry, and increase the cost of implementing
the project. 9
Stage m.  Operational  stage of the project.  At this stf the  the project cycle, two performance
dimensions  need to be considered: the capacity utilization  of the facility and the productivity  of the
"output"  or graduates. Affecting  capacity  utilization,  there is inadequate  market demand and lack of
complementary  inputs. Both are affected  by macro- and trade policies. The productivity  per unit of
"output" (i.e. the return to the improved  human capital in each project graduate or patient) is influenced  by
the quantity and quality of project inputs. They in turn, are affected  by the quality of the curriculum,
financing and quality of textbooks, medicine  and equipment. For these, insufficient  budgetary financing
and trade controls appear to be important.
Capacity  utilization, as well as the productivity  of graduates, is not only determined  by factors
affecting  the supply side of human capital. The demand side is critical as well; high unemployment  or
underemployment  rates will lower tLe demand for project services (particularly  in vocational  or
secondary/tertiary  education)  and lower the productivity  of graduates. Vigorous  economic  growth and
8 Fiscal  balance  and expenditure  policies  are widely  perceived  as being  crucial.  Communications  with  Bank
experts  indicate  that  there  is general  difficulty  in dealing  with institutional  problems  'when  macro  policy  is in a
mess". "Fiscal  problems  and  poor  expenditure  policy  are  what  matter.  [Social]  projects  could  in principle
sometimes  be insulated  from  poor  interest  rate policy  and tariff  distortion-but  it seldom  works  that  way  since
governments  that  are not attacldng  the macro  and trade  policy  distortions  are generally  poor at expenditure
policy  in general  (lots  of money  to state  enterprises,  etc.) and poor at building  up the  sound  public  institutions
they  need  to manage  social  programs'  (Birdsall).
9 This happened  in Zimbabwe,  as communicated  by R. Hecht.Table  1  Factors  influencins  project  performance  in  social  sectors
Problem-svmttom  Determinants
Stages  in  the  Typical  problems  at  Project-level  Sectorat  level  Economy-wide  policies
project  cycle  each project  stage  determinants  determinants  determining  project  performance
1.  Project  *Inappropriate  choice  *Poor  technical  *Inappropriate  sectoral  Stable  economic  growth  in  turn  related  to
preparation  *Itt  designed  project  assistance  and  policy/planning  appropriate  economy-wide  policies  creates  demand
*Urong  technology  project  preparation  *Inability  of  for  high-quality  labor  and  incentives  to  invest  in
(e.g.  hospital  and  appraisal  identifying  the  social  sector.  Fiscal  deficit,  inflation  and
vs.  preventive-care  *Low  quality  priority  within  interest  affect  availability  of  funding.
facilities)  of  domestic  sectors
institution  *Ueak  sectoral
ministries
11.  Project  *Cost  overrun/delays *Supervision  *Over-centralization  Fiscal  deficit  affects  the  avaitability  of
implementation  *Noncompletion  *Management  *No  incentive  for  cost  counterpart  funding.  Macro-instability  associated
*Poor  quality  *Procurement  effectiveness  with  stop-and-go  financing;  inflation  results  in
*Technical  *Poor  management  of  cost-overrun;  restrictions  on exchange  rate  and
assistance  fund  within  sectors  trade  cause shortage of  recurrent  inputs  and
equipment, resulting  in  poor quality  and delay.
111.  Project  *Insufficient  demand  *Poor design of  *Poor design  of  Stable  economic  growth,  which  is  affected  by
operation  for  project  services  curtriculum  curriculum  macroeconomic,  trade  and  pricing  policies,  creates
1. Capacity  *Inappropriate  books  *Misallocation  demand  for  social  project  services;  public
utilization  *Low  quality  and  of  funding  within  expenditure  policy  affects  funding  of  these
il!-inotivated  sectors,  e.g.  services;  competitiveness,  wage  rate,  and  labor
staff  insufficient  furding  market  policies  affect  the  demand  for  the  services
for  recurrent  of  social  projects,  particularly  education.
expenditures,  drugs,
salaries,  books, etc.
IV.  Project  *Inadequate  demand  *Poor  design  of  Poor  distribution  Vigorous  economic  growth  is  critical,  which,  in
operation  for  human  capital  curriculum  of  types  of  schools  turn,  is  determined  by  overall  economic  policies.
2.  Productivity  *Ill-motivated  and  *Inappropriate  books  or  health  care  Structure  of  production  determines  demand  for
of  graduates  ill-equipped  workers  *Low  quality  and  facilities;  normatch  for  workers  with  specific  skills.  Labor  market
Poor  match  of  ill-motivated  of  sectoral  policy  mobility,  wage  rate  policy  affect  employment
jobs  and  skills  staff  and  labor  demand.  and  earnings  of  graduates,  determining  the
rate  of  return  investing  in human  capital;
openness  and competitiveness affects  the
overall  productivity  and earnings.- 17 -
industrialization  increase the demand, employment  opportunity  and potential earnings for healthy and
educated  workers.  Economic  growth is largely determined  by the overall economic  policies pursued by the
government. Labor market policies also matter: low salaries for teachers, restrictions  on labor mobility,
and hiring and firing reduce the earning opportunities  and incentives  to invest in education, causing  under-
utilization  of educational  facilities and misallocation  of labor.  At a sectoral policy level, pricing policies
for public health and education  services can have deleterious  effects  on social projects and the sectors.'°
V.  Data and Measurement  Issues
The data set utilized in our analysis  comprises  of project evaluation  data for 259 Bank-financed
social projects prepared by Operation  Evaluation  Department  (OED), and aggregate  data reflecting
economy-wide  policies compiled  by WDR 1991. The project data cover 84 countries for the period of
1974-1990,  with 34 countries from Africa, 12 from Asia, 17 from EMENA, and 21 from LAC).  For each
project, information  is available  on the rating given by OED regarding  project performance  (satisfactory  or
unsatisfactory  rating) at the time of project evaluation-usually  about 12-18  months after the physical
completion  of project implementation. In addition, the data set includes  the amount of the loan, estimated
cost and actual cost, and dates of completion. Further, for projects evaluated  in 1989 and 1990, the
likelihood  of longer term project sustainability  is also available, although  the number of observations  is
small (N=56).  Economy-wide  policy indicators include, currency over-evaluation  (measured  by black
market premium, a variable reflecting the deviation  between official and black market exchange  rates);
10  In our communications  with Bank  experts  one telling  remar}c:  'when  user charges  in health  are 'too low',
for example, not only is financial  sustainability  of the sector weakened,  but a disproportionate  share of project
benefits  may be captured  by those not in the target group; unnecessary  consumption  may take place because
there is little or no price deterrent; and an ethos of cost-consciousness  and cost-contaimment  is unlikely  to
emerge among managers  in health institutions."  (R. Hecht)- 18 -
Thomas-Halevi  index  on trade restrictions;  real interest rates; fiscal deficit as a share of GDP; and an
index on price distortion of tradable goods by David Dollar; and a modified version of Dollar's price
distortion index."' Among them, indices on trade restrictiveness  and real interest rates ate available  only
for around thirty countries.
There are some measurement  problems with the OED rating of social projects.  Since the
evaluation  is conducted soon after the project completion,  the full stream of benefits and the longer-term
effects (or the sustainability)  of the project are not taken into account. Further, the criteria for rating
across different social sectors (and even within a sector) may not be always the same, since some
subjective  judgements are required given the lack of detailed  numerical  estimates  on costs and benefits.
More generally,  the measurement  errors in the OED rating seem to be biased upwards, meaning that the
unsatisfactory  ratings are for those projects which truly performed very badly, whereas the satisfactory
ratings include mediocre  projects and ventures  of uncertain  performance  quality.
The implications  of measurement  error in the dependent  variable, however, are not as serious as
errors in the independent  variable: under reasonable assumptions,  the estimated  coefficients  are still
statistically  consistent." 2 To deal with this "errors in variable"  problem, we concentrate  our analysis  on
the likelihood  of unsatisfactory  project performance,  treating the other category (conventionally  labeled  as
"satisfactory")  as "all others" instead, i.e., it is s'ipposed to comprise  satisfactory as well as mediocre  or
marginal  projects.  Since the dependent variable represents  the incidence  of failed projects, the estimated
coefficients  should be interpreted  as the effects  of policies on failure rate.  In addition, we will analyze  the
"For  definitions  of variables, see Appendix  table 1.
12In an equation y=Xa  + u,  it is usually  assumed that the X have been measured  without  error, and the
disturbance  term u has been thought  of as representing  the influence  of various explanatory  variables  that have
not been included.  It could also have a component  representing  measurement  error in the dependent  variable y.
Therefore the estimates  using OLS are still consistent  even if there are measurement  errors in y. See Johnston
(1984).- 19  -
information  on the likelihood  of sustainability  as a supplement  measure of OED ratings.
VI.  Results of the Statistical  Analysis
VI.A  Unsatisfactory  projects and economy  policies
Through a simple bi-variate statistical  analysis,  the incidence  of unsatisfactory  projects under
each policy distortion category is calculated  first.  Policy  variables are divided into high vs. low distortion
segments  and the likelihood  of project failure is computed  for each policy distortion  segment. The
following  policy variables are used in the analysis: high/low currency overvaluation  (measured  by the
black market premia), positive/negative  real interest rate, high/low degree of trade restrictiveness
(measured  by Thomas-Halevi  index of tariffs and quantitative  trade restrictions), high/low fiscal deficit as a
share of GDP, and high/low degree of relative price distortions  in tradable goods (measured  by the index
constructed  by D. Dollar).  In addition, high/low growth rate of GDP is included.
Among 259 social projects, fifty-two  (20 percent of the samples)  are rated as unsatisfactory.
Results from cross-tabulations  show that the economic  regime's trade restrictiveness,  currency
overvaluation,  fiscal deficit, price distortions, and GDP growth are significantly  associated  with the
performance  of social projects, which is similar to what was found for projects in other than social sectors
(Table 2).  No social project failed when trade barriers are low, as compared with a probability  of failure
of almost 30 percent when trade restrictions are relatively  high or very high.  When the black market
premium is high, 37 percent of the projects failed, which is more than double the likelihood  of project
failure when there is low premium (17.4 percent).  Similarly,  when the fiscal deficit is big, the projects
have a much higher probability  of performing  poorly.  And when relative prices are distorted, the
likelihood  of poor project performance  is higher.  The overall performance  of the economy, as measured
by GDP growth, (which in turn is associated  with the overall policy framework)  matters as well:- 20 -
Table  2  Summary:  Imnact  of  economy-wide  wolicies  on  the  performance  of  social  and  nonsocial  orolects
Percentage  of  unsatisfactory  projects
Economy-wide  Social  proiects  Nonsocial
policy  variables  AlI  Education  Health  projects
Number  of  prolects  259  228  31  1488
Percentage  unsatisfactory  20.1  17.5  38.7  21.6
Trade  restrictiveness
Low  0.0**  0.0*  INSF  16.3**
High  28.1**  23.9*  INSF  24.9**
Black  market  premium
Low  17.4***  13.6***  42.3  19.5***
High  37.0"**  39.0***  20.0  36.7""*
Fiscal  deficit
Low  11.3**  11.1  12.5**  14.3***
High  29.2**  22.6  58.3**  25.4***
Price  distortions
Low  14.8**  11.9**  28.6*  18.1***
High  25.7**  22.9**  6?.5*  25.3***
Real  interest  rate
Positive  17.5  13.7  33.3  16.4
Negative  29.4  23.3  75.0  17.4
Growth  of  GDP
High  14.4*  11.4*  33.3  16.9*"*
Low  23.8*  21.3*  60.0  28.3***
Note: This  is  a  summary  table  based  on  information  given  in  Tables  4-5. For  definitions  of  variables,  and
benchmark  for  each  variable  see  Tables  4-5  and  Appendix  Table  A-1.  INSF  stands  for  insufficient  number  of
observations.
Significance  leveLs  based  on  Chi-squares  for  each  crosstab:
**  Represents  significant  at  the  99  percent  confidence  level.
*  Represents  significant  at  the  95  percent  confidence  level.
*  Represents  significant  at  90  the  percent  confidence  level.
No  asterisk:  Significance  Less  than  90  percent.- 21 -
for economies  growing at an annual rate of 2 percent or above, the probability  of failing is significantly
larger than for economies  with a low growth rate.
As summarized  in Table 2, and shown in detail in Tables 4 to 5 at the end of the paper, the
above effects are statistically  significant  with Chi-squares  ranging from 2.9 to 8.5 (the critical value is 2.7
with 90 percent confidence),  suggesting  strong statistical  association  between policy variables and the
performance  of projects. The impact of the real interest rate, while in the expected  direction, is not
significant,  however.  Aside from the possibility  of measurement  error, it may be possible to insulate social
projects from financial  market policies, since counter part funding  generally comes from the government
budget.
Using a subsample  of 228 educational projects, with forty of them unsatisfactory,  the impacts  of
most policy variables become even more significant  (summarized  in Table 2, second column  and detailed
in Table 5).  The failing rate nearly tripled (39 versus 13.6 percent) when the black market premium is
high, as compared  to low premium. As the fiscal deficit is in the medium or high range, the probability  of
failing is two-to-three  times as high as that when the deficit is less than 4 percent of GDP.  Price
distortion also seem to matter: The likelihood  of failing is nearly doubled in a more distorted pricing
environment  than in a less distorted one.  The statistical significance  also increase, the Chi-squares  ranging
up to 14.1 (Table 5).
Among health projects, the probability  of failing (38.7 percent) is much higher than for
education  projects. Only two out of six policy variables are significantly  associated  with the performance  of
health project.  This is probably  due to the insufficient  number  of observations  for some policy variables
(trade restrictiveness),  and perhaps more importantly,  to the complexity  and diversity of health, nutrition
and population programs, as well as the associated  difficulties  in evaluating  them.  Nonetheless,  the results
still show a significant  association  between the country's fiscal deficit and its degree of price distertions, on
the one hand, and the performance  of health projects on the other.- 22 -
For comparison  pi -poses, similar crosstab analysis  is conducted  for nonsocial  projects utilizing
the OED data on the project rating (unsatisfactory  versus satisfactory)." 3 The relationship  between
policies and project performance  is not very different from those for projects in the social sectors.  In
addition, we tested through F-test whether  the bi-variate relationship  between  economny-wide  policies and
the probability  for project failure was statistically  different for projects in the social sectors from those for
other types of projects.  In fact, the null hypothesis  that the impact  of policies on the likelihood  of project
failure is the same for social and nonsocial  projects could not be rejected  using F test.  This is particularly
telling, given the recent evidence  on how large the impact  of policies on the economic  rate of return of
nonsocial (tradeable and non-tradeable) projects is.14
VI.B  Results on longer-term  project sustainability
As indicated  in Section  V, the project performance  variable (sat/unsat) is likely to be subject  to
measurement  error.  In particular, the universe  of projects rated as satisfactory  is likely to contain projects
which are not fully satisfactory. Furthermore, the sat/unsat rating does not filly incorporate  an assessment
of project benefits.  While the qualitative  nature of the results indicating  a positive  correlation  between the
quality of economy-wide  policies and project performance  is unlikely to be affected, it is warranted to
explore an alternative  data set.  In this subsection,  we use the limited information  on sustainability  of social
projects, which is available  for only 56 projects evaluated  in 1989 and 1990. For these years, only the
black market premia variable  has a sufficient  number of  observations  for matching  the policy index  with
the project performance  variable. A bivariate crosstabulation  analysis  is thus performed between  the black
31  The  cross-tabs  for health  sector  and for nonsocial  projects  are available  from  the authors  upon  request.
14  Projects  outside  the social  sectors  implemented  in an undistorted  macroeconomic  and total  regime  are
found to have economic  rates of return which are almost twice (or 7-10 percentage  points)  as high as projects
implemented  under a distorted  policy  environment  (Kaufinann  1991)._ GJ  _
market premia and the sustainability  variable.
Project sustainability  concerns the beneficial  effects of a social project in the longer term.  It is
rated as "likely", "marginal", "uncertain"  and "unlicely"  in the OED data set.  On this basis, we divided
the fifty-six  projects into three categories: i) likely to be sustainable;  ii) marginal  or uncertain in
sustainability; and iii) unlikely to be sustainable.
Table 3 presents the crosstabulations  of project sustainability  (measured  by the three categories)
by several policy indicators. Among all evaluated  projects, 59 percent is sustainable, 29 percent mediocre,
and 12 percent a complete  failure.  Currency  overvaluation,  no matter how measured (and what benchmark
is used), show a significant  negative  impact on sustainability. The higher the black market premium in the
country, the lower the likelihood  for the project to be sustainable.  For comparison  purposes, we also
present the sustainability  for nonsocial  projects. Among 267 nonsocial  projects, 51 percent was evaluated
as "likely to be sustainable', a slightly  lower than that for social  projects (59 percent).  Similar association
between sustainability  and policies are found: A project is more likely to have sustainable  positive effects
when the foreign exchange  premium and price distortions  were low, when the fiscal deficit was small, and
when the GDP growth rate was high.- 24 -
Table  3  Proiect  sustainabiLity  for  social  and  nonsocial  projects--statistical  results  from  crosstabulations
Longer-term  sustainability
Marginal  or
Likely  to  be  uncertain  Unlikely  to  Chi-scuare
sustainable  sustainabilitv be  sustainable
Pollcy  Row  Row  Row
distortion  Number (percent)  Number  (percent)  Number  (percent)  X 2 ProbX 2
Social  projects  33  58.S%  16  28.6%  7  12.5%
with  data  on
sustainabilitY
(N=56)
Black  market  oremiun
Low  (Blk-50)  29  74.4%  8  20.5%  2  5.1%
Nigh  (Blk>50)  3  21.4%  7  50.0%  4  28.6%
Chi-square  12.9  0.00
Low  (Blk  =75)  29  69.1%  8  19.1%  5  11.9%
High  (Blk>75)  3  27.3%  7  63.6%  1  9.09%
Chi-square  8.7  0.01
Nonsocial  projects
with  data  on
sustainabilitv  138  51.7%  81  30.3%  48  17.9%  ---  ---
(N=267)
Black  market  oremiui
Low  (Blk-50)  120  55.1%  64  29.4%  34  15.6%
High  (Blk>50)  15  37.5%  14  35.0%  11  27.5%
Chi-square  5.09  0.08
Low  (Blk-75)  121  53.8%  67  29.8%  37  16.4%
High  (8Lk>75)  14  42.4%  11  33.3%  8  24.2%
Chi-square  1.83  0.4
Price  distortion
Low  (Dollar;=100)  88  57.1%  45  29.2%  21  13.6%
High  (Dollar<100)  37  42.5%  28  32.2%  22  25.3%
Chi-square  6.68  0.04
Fiscal  deficit
Low  (Mbalan=-4)  13  65.0%  4  20.0%  3  15%
High  (Mbalan<-4)  21  45.6%  14  30.4%  11  23.9%
Chi-square  2.09  0.35
GDP  arowth
High  (MGDPZ'=2)  51  54.8%  29  31.2%  13  14.0%
Low  (MGDPZ<2)  6  27.3%  11  50.0%  5  22.7%
Chi-square  5.41  0.07
Notes:  Numbers  for  each  crosstab  do  not  add  up  to  the  total  due  to  missing  values  for  policy  varinoles.  Chi-
squares  and  Probability>Chi-squares  for  each  crosstab  are  presented.  These  statistics  test  the  null  hypothesis
of  no  association  between  the  row  variable  and  the  column  variable.  With  degree  of  freedom  of  1  (for  dummy
variable  of  0  and  1);  the  critical  value  for  Chi-square  is  2.7  for  90  percent  confidence  Level.- 25 -
VI.C  Probit analysis
To further explore the correlation  between  economy  -wide  policies and project performance  in
social sectors, a probit analysis was conducted. A full model for the determinants  of project performance
should have economy-wide,  sector-level, as well as project-level  factors.  Data availability  is a constraint,
however.  Furthermore, our objective at this stage is not to establish  and test a complete and general
deterministic  model, but to initiate the investigation  of the relationship  between  economy-wide  policies and
project performance. Therefore, a simple empirical  model is presented. It is hypothesized  that the
probability  of having an unsatisfactory  project is affected  by individual  or multiple indices  reflecting
different dimensions  of economy-wide  policies (Pi), and GDP growth (MGDPZ) and regional dummies".
Model 1:
Prob(UNSA1)  =aO  +a1P 1 .+2P2+africa+c 4EMENA  +aL4C
Model 2:
Prob  NSA7)=POIPIP 1 +p2P 2+P 3MGDPZ+P4rica+p 5 EMENA  .P 6L4C
Table 6-9 present the results from Probit analysis  for single and multiple policy models using all
social and education  projects, respectively. Table 6-7 use all 259 social projects and Table 8-9 use 228
education  projects only. The results suggest  that currency  overvaluation,  fiscal balance, price distortion and
GDP growth are statistically  important  factors influencing  the performance  of social projects. In Table 6,
black market premium, no matter how it is measured (by three-year  moving averages  or by natural
logarithm), has a significant  positive effect on the probability  of the project failure.  A variable measuring
price distortion in tradables (AHDOLLAR)  is also significant  across models and samples. Fiscal deficits,
15 For definitions  of variables,  please  see Appendix  table 1.  Asia is the left-out  regional  dummy.- 26 -
at low-to-medium  range, also positively  affect the probability  of project failure (while it has no significant
impact  once the deficit exceeds about 4 percent of GDP).  This "kinked' effect of fiscal balance is detected
by the inclusion  of two spline variables (BALANKI and BALANK2).  BALANK1  is statistically  significant
in 3 out of 4 equations  in Table 6 and 8, suggesting  the possibility  of a nonlinear or "kinked' relationship
between fiscal deficit and project performance. Model 2 controls  for the (three-year  moving  average of)
annual GDP growth rate, which has negative  and significant  coefficients-suggesting  that the higher the
growth rate, the lower the probability  of project failure.  Our intention  is to show that the effects of
economy-wide  policies do not go away even when the overall economic  dynamism  is controlled  for, but
not to suggest any 'causal" relationship.  When multi-policy  models  are estimated (Table 7), the significant
effects of currency overevaluation  do not disappear, while  the fiscal balance  variables become insignificant.
Analyzing  the subsample  of 228 educational  projects (Table 8-9), the results are consistent,
except that the effects of black market premium and fiscal balance  become more significant. The slope
coefficients  are quite similar with those estimated  for all social projects, except for those which are not
significant.  In Table 9 when multi-policy  models  are used on education  projects, the effects of both black
market premium and fiscal balance are more significant  than those for all social projects. Although the
trade restrictiveness  variable (Thomas-Halevi  index)  was strongly associated  with the probability  of project
failure in the bivariate cross-tabulation  analysis,  their effects are not statistically  significant  here.  In part
the explanation  lies in the fact that in crosstabulations  we are analyzing  the total effects, whereas in the
multivariate  analysis  we are looking at partial effect, holding everything  else constant (some effects are
captured by the constant term, or the GDP growth). Furthermore, the number of observations  for ftis
policy variable is small and there is relatively  little variation in it.
Since Probit analysis  requires the assumption  of normal distribution  of the error term, we also
performed a Logit regression analysis  to test the sensitivity  of the results to different assumptions  regarding
the distribution of the error term Oogistic  in this case). Results show that the signs of the estimated
coefficients  are consistent  and the magnitude  of the coefficients  vary little for those variables which are- 27 -
statistically  significant. The overall results suggest  that the estimates  are relatively  insensitive  to changes  in
the estimation  methods, to various measures  of policy variables, and to different samples  used.
VII.  Summary  and Conclusions
This paper provided an initial investigation  of the impact  of economy-wide  policies on the
performance  of projects in the social sectors.  After briefly reviewing  the literature and case studies, we
presented an analytical  framework  suggesting  mechanisms  through which economy-wide  policies affect
each stage of a project cycle.  Then, the statistical  analysis  was carried out.  The bivariate statistical
analysis on the incidence  of unsatisfactory projects suggested  that trade restrictiveness,  currency
overvaluation,  fiscal deficit, and relative price distortions  are significantly  correlated with project
performance  in the social sectors.  Shortly after completion  of project implementation,  social projects are
twice-to-three  times more likely to be rated as unsatisfactory  in settings where trade barriers and price
distortions  are high, where the fiscal deficit is not small, or where the currency is overvalued. These
effects are even more significant  when the subsample  of education  projects, comprising  the large majority
of Bank projects in the social sectors, is analyzed  independently. And when the data on longer term
project sustainability  is also incorporated  into the analysis,  the relationship  between  policy distortions  and
project sustainability  appears  to hold strongly as well.
A multivariate  Probit analysis  was then carried out to further explore the determinants  of the
probability  of project failure.  Using all 259 observations,  black market premium and fiscal deficit  showed
positive and significant  effects on the probability  of project failure.  The degree of price distortions  also
showed positive and significant  impact, while a negative  association  was found between  the probability  of
project failure and the overall dynamism  of the economy-measured  by GDP growth, which is expected.
Analyzing  education  projects alone, the statistical  evidence  is even stronger.  The degree of trade
restrictiveness  performs in the expected  direction, but was not statistically  significant  in the multivariate- 28 -
analysis. The results from a multivariate  Logit analysis  were similar to the Probit estimations,  suggesting
that the results are not sensitive to the assumptions  on the distribution  of the error term.
We also tested whether  the bivariate relationship  between policies and the probability  of project
failure was statistically  different for social and nonsocial  projects-given the recent evidence  on how large
the impact  of policies on the economic  rate of return of nonsocial  projects is.  Using F test, the null
hypothesis  that the effects of policies on the likelihood  of project failure was the same for social and other
projects could not be rejected.
The overall evidence  presented  in this paper does suggest  therefore that economy-wide  policies
matter significantly  for success in the implementation  of social projects.  Indeed, the data does not support
the notion that World Bank projects in the social sectors may be better insulated from the overall policy
framework  than other types of projects.  And it can be further hypothesized  that the overall impact  of
economy-wide  policies on project performance  may be even larger for projects implemented  by other
agencies, external or domestic-the reason being that the sheer 'clout' and resources of the Bank are often
put to use to try and partially insulate projects from macro-distortions  (with varying  degrees of success,
through special institutional,  procurement  and financial  arrangements,  etc.).
This paper, however, should only be regarded as an initial effort to address the complex
mechanisms  by which the overall economic  policies of a country affect project performance  in the social
sectors.  The multiplicity  of approaches  taken here, both with respect to data sources and methodologies
were aimed to compensate  for the pitfalls of each individual  data source.  The outcome of all approaches
do point to the same direction, namely that economy-wide  policies appear to be important  in explaining  the
performance  of social projects. But more research is required.  First, further tests to ascertain  the
robustness  of the results presented  here with additional  data are warranted. Second, a more in-depth
exploration  of the 'black box' linking economy-wide  policies and project performance  is needed. Whether
the link between macroeconomic  policies and social project failure is merely an association, or a strong
causal relationship, requires further analysis. While the framework  and results presented in the paper- 29 -
(such as the fact that policy distortions  independently  affect the probability  of project failure even after
controlling  for GDP growth) lend support to the 'causal link' hypothesis, it does not rule out the possible
importance  of the 'mere association'  hypothesis  as well.
The findings  presented in the paper, if corroborated  through further research, also have
important  policy implications,  particularly regarding the design of an adequate  lending strategy in countries
with inappropriate  macroeconomic,  trade, and pricing policy regimes. The findings underscore  the need of
linking the strategy in the social sectors, even at the project level, to the overall structural adjustment  and
economy-wide  policies that a country is pursuing.
The results of the analysis  also point to the importance  of fully integrating  the existing and
expected  policy framework  of the overall economy  into the project preparation  process and into the project
appraisal documents. Similarly, the project evaluation  documents  at the time of project completion  (PCRs
and PPARs) need to cover the economy-wide  policies, pricing (wages/service  fees) policies of related
sectors and their impact  on projects more systematically. Finally, efforts to improve  on the data collection
requirements  for project appraisal and evaluation  in the social sectors may have significant  payoffs.
Improved  project decision-making  could result, as well as an enhanced  statistical  understanding  of the key
determinants  of the productivity  of social projects. The paucity of robust quantitative  information  on the
costs and benefits of social projects may have perpetuated  the false notion that, in contrast with other types
of projects, social projects may be insulated  from the effects of economy-wide  policies.- 30  -
Table  4  Incidence  of unsatisfactory  social  projects  and oolicies:  Results  from
statistical  crosstabulation  analysis
Proiect  verformance
Unsatisfactory  Others  Chi-scuare
Policies  Number  Row  %  Number  Row  %  X2 Prob>X 2
All  sample  (N=259)  52  20.1%  207  79.9%
Grou2ed  bv:
Trade  restrictiveness
Low  (Halevi>=3)  0  0%  11  100%
High  (Halevi<3)  16  28.1%  41  71.9%
Chi-square  4.04  0.04
Black  market  premium
Low  (Mblk<=75)  34  17.4%  161  82.6%
High  (Mblk>75)  17  37.0%  29  63.0%
Chi-square  8.50  0.00
Fiscal  deficit
Low  (Mbalan)>=-4)  6  11.3%  47  88.7%
High  (Mbalan<-4)  19  29.2%  46  70.8%
Chi-square  5.61  0.02
Price  distortions
Low  (Dollar>=100)  18  14.8%  104  85.2%
High  (Dollar<100)  29  25.7%  84  74.3%
Chi-square  4.36  0.03
Low  (AHDollar<0.5)  7  13.2%  46  86.8%
High  (AHDollar>=0.5)  12  28.6%  30  71.4%
Chi-square  3.46  0.06
Real  interest  rate
Positive  11  17.5%  52  82.5%
Negative  10  29.4%  24  70.6%
Chi-square  1.86  0.17
Growth  of GDP
High  (MGDPZ>=2)  19  14.4%  113  85.6%
Low  (MGDPZ<2)  19  23.8%  61  76.2%
Chi-square  2.96  0.08
Note:  Total  sample  =  259. Numbers  for  each  crosstab  do  not  add-up  to  the  total  due  to  missing  values  for  policy
variables.  Chi-squares  and  Probabltity4Chi-squares  for  each  crosstab  are  presented.  These  statistics  test  the
nulL  hypothesis  of  no  association  between  the  row  variable  and  the  coLum  variable.  With  degree  of  freedom  of  I
(for  dummy  variable  of  0  and  1);  the  critical  value  for  Chi-square  is  2.7  for  90  percent  confidence  level.- 31  -
Table  5  Education:  Incidence  of unsatisfactory  rrolects  and policies.  Results
from  statistical  crosstabulation  analysis
Project  performance
Unsatisfactory  Others  Chi-sauare
Policies  Number  Row  %  Number  Row  %  X2 Prob>X 2
Education  (N=228)  40  17.5%  188  82.5%
GrouRed  by:
Trade  restrictiveness
Low  (Halevi>=3)  0  0%  11  100%
High  (Halevi<3)  11  23.9%  35  76.1%
Chi-square  3.26  0.07
Black  market  Dremium
Low  (Mblkc=75)  23  13.6%  146  86.4%
High  (Mblk>75)  16  39.0%  25  61.0%
Chi-square  14.09  0.00
Fiscal  deficit
Low  (Mbalan>=-4)  5  11.1%  40  88.9%
High  (Mbalan<-4)  12  22.6%  41  77.4%
Chi-square  2.25  0.13
Price  distortions
Low  (Dollar>=100)  12  11.9%  89  88.1%
High  (Dollar<100)  24  22.9%  81  77.1%
Chi-square  4.30  0.04
Low  (AHDollar<0.5)  4  9.30%  39  90.7%
High  (AHDollar>=0.5)  7  20.6%  27  79.4%
Chi-square  1.98  0.16
Real  interest  rate
Positive  7  13.7%  44  86.3%
Negative  7  23.3%  23  76.7%
Chi-square  1.22  0.27
Growth  of GDP
High  (MGDPZ>=2)  13  11.4%  101  88.6%
Low  (MGDPZ<2)  16  21.3%  59  78.7%
Chi-square  3.43  0.06
Note:  Number  of education  projects  =  228.  See,  also,  the  note  of  Table  4.- 32  -
Table  6  Probit:  Impact  of 2olicies  on the  performance  of  all  social  proiects
Dependent  Variable:  Dummy  for  unsatisfactory  projects
Model  1  Model  2
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Currency  over-valuation
Specification  1
Constant  -1.2093  -5.86  -1.0860  -4.18
M2BLACK  0.0043  3.02  0.0034  2.31
MSM2BLK  -0.6308  -1.26  -0.7680  -1.45
MGDPZ  -0.0553  -1.81
MSGDP  0.2497  1.01
Africa  0.2538  1.02  0.2559  0.95
EMENA  0.4128  1.49  0.4273  1.52
LAC  0.1482  0.54  0.0742  0.25
Log  likelihood  -122.43  -119.23
Currency  over-valuation
Specification  2
Constant  -1.2031  -5.77  -1.0764  -4.08
LNMBK1OA  0.1155  2.60  0.0877  1.91
MSLNB1OA  -0.5908  -1.17  -0.7545  -1.41
MGDPZ  -0.0567  -1.85
MSGDP  0.2793  1.10
Africa  0.1967  0.79  0.2153  0.80
EMENA  0.3945  1.43  0.4158  1.48
LAC  0.0401  0.14  -0.0082  -0.03
Log  likelihood  123.56  120.06
Fiscal  deficit
Specification  1
Constant  -0.9804  -3.95  -0.7188  -2.38
BALANK1  13.8350  1.64  14.5000  1.74
BALANK2  -2.3937  -0.96  -1.7313  -0.68
MSBALAN  -3.0331  -0.13  -0.3040  -1.13
MGDPZ  -8.0807  -2.61
MSGDP  0.3022  1.20
Africa  0.1299  0.52  0.1517  0.56
EMENA  0.2577  0.88  0.3514  1.18
LAC  0.1446  0.52  0.0521  0.18
Log  likelihood  -126.12  -120  18- 33  -
Table  6  (continued)
Model  1  Model  2
Variable  Coefficient  t  coefficient  t
Fiscal  deficit
Specification  2
Constant  -0.7047  -2.92  -0.5629  -2.02
DBALAN  -0.5961  -2.06  -0.4863  -1.65
MSBALAN  -0.3311  -1.61  -0.5133  -2.33
MGDPZ  -0.0729  -2.39
MSGDP  0.3293  1.32
Africa  0.1622  0.65  0.2104  0.78
EMENA  0.2807  0.99  0.3768  1.30
LAC  0.1656  0.60  0.0939  0.32
Log  likelihood  -126.35  -121.03
Price  distortion
Specification  1
Constant  11.1010  1.09  7.2543  0.70
DOLLAR4  -0.1205  -1.19  -0.0810  -0.78
MSDOLLAR  -12.0760  -1.20  -8.2964  -0.80
MGDPZ  -0.0685  -2.31
MSGDP  0.2205  0.92
Africa  0.0203  0.07  0.0800  0.25
EMENA  0.3522  1.28  0.4013  1.43
LAC  0.1528  0.56  0.6023  0.21
Log  likelihood  -128.05  -123.49
Price  distortion
Specification  2
Constant  -1.0233  -5.00  -0.7556  -3.02
AHDOLLAR  0.0194  2.07  0.0187  2.03
MSAHDOL  0.0074  0.03  -0.5200  -1.76
MGDPZ  -0.0791  -2.63
MSGDP  0.5194  1.82
Africa  0.1987  0.70  0.5484  1.63
EMENA  0.2645  0.93  0.3725  1.28
LAC  0.1642  0.60  0.1002  0.34
Log likelihood  126.53  -119.74
Note:  Number  of observations  =  259.  Asia  is the  left-out  regional  dummy.- 34 -
Table  7  Probit:  Multi-Dolicy  models  for  all  social  projects
Dependent  variable:  Dummy  for unsatisfactory  projects
Model  1  Model  2
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Specification  1
Constant  -0.7514  -1.58  -0.6339  -1.27
M2BLACK  0.0044  3.04  0.0036  2.37
MSM2BLK  -0.5636  -1.12  -0.6971  -1.29
HALEVI4  -0.1960  -0.77  -0.1725  -0.66
MSHALEVI  -0.5194  -1.20  -0.6182  -1.37
MGDPZ  -0.0533  -1.72
MSGDP  0.3781  1.45
Africa  0.2421  0.97  0.2813  1.04
EMENA  0.4207  1.50  0.4747  1.65
LAC  0.1394  0.50  0.1094  0.36
Log  likelihood  -121.56  -117.73
Specification  2
Constant  -1.1139  -4.29  -0.8747  -2.76
M2BLACK  0.0041  2.73  0.0031  2.03
MSM2BLCK  -0.5817  -1.46  -0.0067  -1.22
BALANKI  12.8630  1.53  13.5250  1.62
BALANK2  -1.1914  -0.46  -0.9132  -0.35
MSBALAN  -0.0563  -0.22  -0.2783  -1.02
MGDPZ  -0.0681  -2.11
MSGDP  0.3089  1.20
Africa  0.1738  0.67  0.2026  0.72
EMENA  0.3168  1.06  0.3895  1.28
LAC  0.1090  0.39  0.0486  0.16
Log  likelihood  -120.77  -116.63
Specification  3
Constant  -0.6382  -1.25  -0.4988  -0.92
M2BLCK  0.0041  2.73  0.0031  2.03
MSM2BLK  -0.5817  -1.46  -0.0067  -1.22
HALEVI4  -0.2304  -0.87  -0.1874  -0.69
MSHALEVI  -0.5710  -1.22  -0.5391  -1.12
BALANK1  12.9670  1.52  13.1710  1.56
BALANK2  -1.2941  -0.50  -1.0970  -0.42
MSBALAN  0.0533  0.19  -0.1541  -0.51
MGDPZ  -0.0629  -1.93
MSGDP  0.3668  1.38
Africa  0.1357  0.52  0.1920  0.68
EMENA  0.2893  0.95  0.3809  1.23
LAC  0.0761  0.27  0.0494  0.16
Log  likelihood  -119.97  -115.88
Note:  Number  of observations  - 259.  Asia  is the  left-out  regional  dummy.-35  -
Table  8  Probit:  Imi2act of  Policies  on the  Rerformance  of education  prolects
Dependent  Variable:  Dummy  for unsatisfactory  projects
Model  1  Model  2
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Currency  over-valuation
Siecification  1
Constant  -1.4734  -5.63  -1.4614  -4.47
M2BLACK  0.0058  3.73  0.0048  2.97
MSM2BLK  -0.4759  -0.93  -0.6608  -1.19
MGDPZ  -0.0457  -1.37
MSGDP  0.3906  1.38
Africa  0.4587  1.57  0.5511  1.69
EMENA  0.3179  0.94  0.4159  1.82
LAC  0.1848  0.56  0.1890  0.53
Log  likelihood  - 96.34  -93.63
Currencv  over-valuation
Specification  2
Constant  -1.4285  -5.51  -1.4207  -4.35
LNMBK1OA  0.1430  2.98  0.1136  2.30
MSLNB1OA  -0.4498  -0.87  -0.6748  -1.20
MGDPZ  -0.0495  -1.49
MSGDP  0.4399  1.57
Africa  0.3738  1.30  0.4918  1.52
EMENA  0.2821  0.84  0.3945  1.13
LAC  0.0547  0.17  0.0828  -0.23
Log  likelihood  -98.81  -95.38
Fiscal  deficit
Specification  1
Constant  -1.0220  -3.50  -0.8006  -2.23
BALANK1  14.9290  1.71  15.2840  1.79
BALANK2  1.3225  0.40  2.4165  0.71
MSBALAN  -0.1530  -0.57  -0.5169  -1.72
MGDPZ  -0.0816  -2.42
MSGDP  0.4639  1.64
Africa  0.3382  1.20  0.4590  1.45
EMENA  0.2824  0.84  0.4596  1.31
LAC  0.2186  0.69  0.1934  0.56
Log  likelihood  -103.23  -27.26- 36  -
Table  8  (continued)
Model  1  Model  2
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Fiscal  deficit
Slecification  2
Constant  -0.9805  -3.38  -0.9077  -2.72
DBALAN  -0.4235  -1.30  -0.3272  -0.98
MSBALAN  -0.1848  -0.80  -0.4438  -1.73
MGDPZ  -0.0703  -2.12
MSGDP  -0.5201  -1.83
Africa  0.3508  1.25  0.4980  1.59
EMENA  0.2071  0.63  0.3813  1.10
LAC  0.2195  0.69  0.2216  0.64
Log likelihood  -103.9Q  -98.49
Price distortion
Specification  1
Constant  8.2170  0.75  2.0740  0.18
DOLLAR4  -0.0935  -0.86  -0.0321  -0.29
MSDOLLAR  -9.3529  -0.86  -3.4367  -0.31
MGDPZ  -0.0673  -2.07
MSGDP  0.3790  1.42
Africa  0.2407  0.72  0.4268  1.17
EMENA  0.2744  0.85  0.4094  1.21
LAC  0.1960  0.62  0.1711  0.50
Log  likelihood  -104.40  -99.74
Price  distortion
SDecification  2
Constant  -1.2682  -4.86  -1.0625  -3.41
AHDOLLAR  0.0193  1.89  0.0184  1.85
MSAHDOL  0.1668  0.63  -0.3718  -1.12
MGDPZ  -0.0720  -2.23
MSGDP  0.5966  1.91
Africa  0.3011  0.96  0.7101  1.88
EMENA  0.1785  0.54  0.3281  0.96
LAC  0.1994  0.63  0.1899  0.55
Log likelihood  -102.91  -97.31
Trade  restrictiveness
Constant  -0.6997  -1.30  -0.6548  -1.51
HALEVI4  -0.2559  -0.91  -0.2226  -0.75
MSHALEVI  -0.4928  -1.02  -0.6164  -1.22
MGDPZ  -0.0643  -2.03
MSGDP  0.4712  1.68
Africa  0.3676  1.33  0.4667  1.52
EMENA  0.2627  0.81  0.3915  1.16
LAC  0.1939  0.61  0.1946  0.56
Log  likelihood  -104.24  -99.Q7
uot-e  N-228.  Asia  is the  left out regional  dummy.-37  -
Table 9  Probit:  Multi-policy model for Education Prolects
Dependent Variable: Dummy for unsatisfactory projects
Model 1  Model 2
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Soecification 1
Constant  -1.1228  -1.95  -1.0787  -1.77
M2BLACK  0.0058  3.68  0.0048  2.97
MSM2BLK  -0,4379  -0.85  -0.6088  -1.08
HALEVI4  -0.1541  -0.53  -0.1371  -0.45
MSHALEVI  -0.3691  -0.74  -0.4894  -0.94
MGDPZ  -0.0461  -1.37
MSGDP  0.4785  1.62
Africa  0.4372  1.49  0.5578  1.70
EMENA  0.2930  0.85  0.4255  1.19
LAC  0.1709  0.51  0.2182  0.60
Log likelihood  -96.40  -92.90
Specification 2
Constant  -1.1899  -3.76  -1.0021  -2.60
M2BLACK  0.0065  3.88  0.0054  3.08
MSM2BLK  -0.4520  -0.87  -0.5527  -0.98
BALANK1  14.6490  1.68  14.8880  1.73
BALANK2  6.2521  1.52  6.3806  1.54
MSBALAN  -0.3272  -1.10  -0.5824  -1.82
MGDPZ  -0.0626  -1.76
MSGDP  0.3880  1.29
Africa  0.4559  1.50  0.5533  1.64
EMENA  0.4254  1.18  0.5548  1.49
LAC  0.1904  0.56  0.1941  0.54
Log likelihood  -94.01  -90.89
Specification 3
Constant  -0.6570  -1.04  -0.5509  -0.82
M2BLACK  0.0067  3.85  0.0056  3.11
MSM2BLK  -0.4311  -0.83  -0.5313  -0.94
HALEVI4  -0.2523  -0.81  -0.2147  -0.66
MSHALEVI  -0.5786  -1.06  -0.5502  -0.97
BALANK1  14.6860  1.66  14.6210  1.68
BALANK2  6.9397  1.62  7.0116  1.64
MSBALAN  -0.2728  -0.87  -0.5144  -1.53
MGDPZ  -0.0600  -1.68
MSGDP  0.4174  1.37
Africa  0.4241  1.38  0.5452  1.60
EMENA  0.3917  1.07  0.5435  1.44
LAC  0.1569  0.45  0.1911  0.52
Log likelihood  -93.44  -90.36
Note:  N=228. Asia is the left out regional dummy.-38-
APPENDIX
Appendix table 1  Definitions of variables
Variable name  Definitions and sources
Halevi  Thomas-Halevi index on trade restrictiveness based on both
tariffs and quantity restrictions, with 1=most restrictive and
5=most open.  Source:  Thomas, Halevi and Stanton, 1991.
Black or Blk  Black market premium based on the difference between official
exchange rate and black market rates.  Source:  Pick's Currency
Yearbook.
MBlk  Three-year moving average of Black.
M2Black  Three-year moving average of a truncated Black at 200 percent.
lnMblklOa  Natural  logarithm  of  MBlk  with  a  benchmark  of  10.
Mbalan  Fiscal  imbalance  as a percentage of GDP (negative values
indicate  deficits).
Dbalan  A dummy variable for low fiscal deficit  (=  1  if  Mbalan  >=-4;
= 0  otherwise).
BalarKl  = Mbalan  if  Mbalan  >=-4;  = 0  otherwise.
BalanK2  =  Mbalan  if  Mbalan  <-4;  = 0  otherwise.
Dollar  PPI  based  price  distortion  index  with a bigger value indicating
less distorted prices.  Source:  David Dollar, 1991.
AHDollar  Modified version of Dollar's relative price index.  Takes the
relative price of consumption goods from Summers-Heston and
purges it of its nontraded component by taking the residual of a
regression of the index on urbanization, land and population.  A
bigger value indicates a more distorted price in tradables.
Source:  Ann Harrison, 1991.
Real  Real interest rate computed by subtracting inflation rate from
nominal interest or rate.  Source:  Alan Gelb, 1990.
MGDPZ  Five-year moving average of annual growth rate of GDP by
country.
MS  Dummy variables for each policy variables (=1  when the variable
is missing, =0 otherwise).
Africa  =  1 if the project is located in Africa; =  0 otherwise.
Asia  =  1 if the project is located in Asia; =  0 otherwise.
EMENA  =  1 if the project is located in Europe, Middle East, and North
Africa; =  0 otherwise.
LAC  =  1  if the project is located in Latin America; - 0 otherwise.- 39 -
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